

Freedom and Truth in Public Sphere, and the Contest of Fake News: A Reflection from Kant and Hannah Arendt

Zilmara de Jesus Viana de Carvalho

Professor the Philosophy, Dept. of Philosophy and Graduate Program of Culture and Society, Federal University of Maranhão (UFMA)

Matheus Costa e Costa

Graduate Program of Culture and Society, Interdisciplinary Master, Federal University of Maranhão (UFMA)

Rayssa Marchão Araújo

Graduate Program of Culture and Society, Interdisciplinary Master, Federal University of Maranhão (UFMA)

Kamila Fernanda Barbosa Sampaio

Professor of the Philosophy Course, State University of Maranhão (UEMA), Brazil

Flávio Luiz de Castro Freitas

Professor of the Degree Course in Human Sciences and Graduate Program of Culture and Society, Federal University of Maranhão (UFMA)

Abstract

It aims to address the freedom of speech issue from a Kantian point of view, based on the concepts about public use of reason and thinking for oneself, the required conditions for publicity and its relation to fair, as opposed to the unfair and the lie. Moreover, this study addresses the problem of factual truth within the political sphere linked to the use of lies in the different means of communication, and how the fake news reveal themselves as dangerous to the current democratic states, it has, regarding this point, as the main theoretical framework Hannah Arendt's teachings.

Keywords: Factual Truth, Politics, Lie, Freedom of Speech, Autonomy, Fake News

1. Introduction

The ethics in the media gained a new highlight with emerge of social networks. Currently, such media have a great importance in the political world, they help people's articulation for the defense of their collective interests, as well as the exercising of power inspection. However, it is a favorable space for manipulation of facts and organized lies that help the formation of public opinions mainly derived from

political authorities.

Firstly, this article addresses the freedom of speech issue and, thus, the public use of reason as an expression from the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, author of enlightenment era, who defends this means as essential for the process of enlightenment. For this purpose, this study emphasizes the inseparable relationship between freedom of thought and freedom to communicate thought, as well as the aim regarding public use of reason and the limits that they are.

Furthermore, it treats the issue of ethics in means of communication from the perspective of Hannah Arendt's contemporary thought, a philosopher who analyzes how the factual truth can be manipulated and destroyed by power within the political sphere. Based on this, it presents a reflection in parallel with the contemporary and political phenomenon of post-truth, political figures throughout the world practice it, they use fraudulent news not aiming common good, but to achieve, in the best way, interests of those who exercise and rule the political power.

2. The Use of Reason and Freedom of Thought

The German philosopher of the enlightenment, Immanuel Kant (1991, p.98), in his opulent *An Answer to the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?'*, affirms that the enlightenment is man's exit from his self-incurred immaturity which himself is the guilty, in the case of its cause is not in the lack of understanding, but in the lack of decision and courage to use own understanding without the aid of another. Nevertheless, for enlightenment only freedom is necessary, and its most inoffensive way is what we call of freedom to make public use of reason about all issues.

Even with limits of freedom everywhere, the public, especially in the condition of erudite, should submit only to their own reason. Sometimes, the private use of reason can be limited, yet it does not prevent the enlightenment. However, the enlightenment happens through the public use of reason that always must be free. *Sapere aude!* As Kant said, dare to think and it is the motto of enlightenment. Therefore, as Bobbio (2000, p. 243) rightly points out the freedom of thought is fundamental to achieve enlightenment. According to Bobbio, Kant was extremely aware of the importance of enlightenment values which he interpreted as the base for humanity emancipation. The freedom of thought was in the basis of all others. The state that was inspired by the freedom of thought should require, as a state, total obedience. On the other hand, as a promoter of enlightenment, the state must give for citizens the possibility of exit from immaturity and become rational beings through the freedom of thought.

In this regard, Kant in his text *What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?* strongly defends the freedom of thought, he affirms that it is intrinsic to the communicability of what one thinks; so who abdicates or is prohibited of freedom to speak also is deprived of own freedom of thought, since "how much and how correctly would we *think* if we did not think as it were in community with others to whom we *communicate* our thoughts, and who communicate theirs with us!" (Kant, 2001, p. 16). *On the Common Saying* he reaffirms this aspect to declare: "For it is the natural calling of humanity to communicate with one another, above all about what concerns the human being in general" (Kant, 2006, p. 56).

In addition to the freedom of speech defense regarding the public use of reason, there is in Kantian thought the recognition and defense of obedience to the state. According to Bobbio (2000, p. 241), Kant in fact believed that citizens should obey the state in an absolute way; but at the same time, they had the right to publicly express their thoughts about laws. In other words, use their own reason. Furthermore, according to Kant, the quality of a citizen never should be decoupled from the quality of being rational.

So, Immanuel Kant strongly defends the obedience to the state, as well as the men's freedom to publicly use their own thought. In the text *What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?* the philosopher emphasizes the importance of thinking for yourself as much as the obedience to constitutional political power. About thinking for oneself, he affirms:

Thinking for oneself means seeking the supreme touchstone of truth in oneself (Le. in one's own reason); and the maxim of always thinking for oneself is enlightenment (...) To make use of one's own reason means no more than to ask oneself, whenever one is supposed to assume something, whether one could find it feasible to make the ground or the rule on which one assumes it into a universal principle for the use of reason. This test is one that everyone can apply to himself; and with this examination he will see superstition and enthusiasm disappear, even if he falls far short of having the information to refute them on objective grounds (Kant, 2001, p. 18).

This analysis involves politics, considering that we should use the enlightened reason and this thinking for oneself in the political sphere to evaluate if the legislation that sovereign proposes can become a universal principle. Clearly, when citizens note that it cannot, they should use their freedom of speech, and submit the law to public analysis, which as a law emerge from general will.

As François Calori (2015, p. 99) clarifies that it is not only about the defense of publicity by public right, but it strictly binds its transcendental method. Kant (2006, p. 104) in *Toward Perpetual Peace* enunciates this method: "All actions that affect the rights of other human beings, the maxims of which are incompatible with publicity, are unjust." This principle that has an ethical as much as legal nature is just negative, since it leads to recognize what is not fair regarding others. So, in this respect, it is unfair every:

(...) maxim explicitly without thereby thwarting my own aim, if it must rather be *kept secret* if it is to succeed, if I cannot *admit it publicly* without thereby inevitably provoking the resistance of all others to my plan, then the necessary and universal and hence *a priori* understandable opposition to me can be due to nothing other than the injustice with which my maxim threatens everyone (Kant, 2006, p. 105).

According to Calori (2015, p.99) it does not mean that every political maxim should be claimed in public, but only that should be one. Therefore, if one maxim cannot become public and we should keep it in secret, certainly the reason is that it will bring damages to everyone, hence it is unfair.

For Kant it is acceptable that the chief executive allows people express their thought, even when they are under coercive laws, as effect he says: "In every commonwealth there must be *obedience* under the mechanism of the state constitution in accordance with coercive laws (which apply to the whole). But there must also be a *spirit of freedom*" (Kant, 2006, p. 58). In other words, the obedience to established laws should not be an obstacle to the public use of reason and the expression of critical freedom, as well as the public use of reason should not oppose the compliance with established laws: "Argue as much as you

like and about whatever you like, but obey!” (Kant, 1991, p.100) Regarding the affirmative that we should ratiocinate, but obey, Norberto Bobbio (2000, p. 242) comments about the meaning of the subject must obey and ratiocinate. He affirms that on one hand, as a private citizen, the subject should obey, and respect the standards of law; however, as man’s reason, the subject should publicly use one’s reason. It means that the subject criticizes those same laws which he respects, if believes they are unfair. As a result, the citizens’ rights to publicly express their own thought is necessary, also the sovereign should not hinder it with condemnations or other ways to reprimand.

Kant understands the freedom of thought, here you can interpret as the freedom to communicate thought. Thinking and communicating cannot be decoupled as a way for people’s enlightenment, such as he says in *The Conflict of the Faculties* that “Thus the prohibition of publicity impedes the progress of a people toward improvement” (Kant, 1979, p. 161). Even so, we never should use the freedom of speech in law without prudence and let alone with purpose of damaging others. It also should not be a tool for the distribution of fraudulent news for promotion of lies which can easily be applied to what we know today as fake news.

In the work *On a Supposed to Tell Lies from Benevolent Motives*, the German philosopher analyzes the lie from a legal point of view, in other words, if the lie is conforming to a positive right. Kant (1909) concludes that give true statements, while we can avoid it, is a man’s formal responsibility to others, regardless of the damage that it can cause to himself or another man. It refers to the field of law, in the ethics sphere the lie would be a violation of duty for oneself. Still about the lie, the philosopher in *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant assures:

Then I soon become aware that I could indeed will the lie, but by no means a universal law to lie; for in accordance with such a law there would properly be no promises at all, since it would be futile to avow my will with regard to my future actions to others who would not believe this avowal (1998, p. 15).

Kant says the lie is always a declaration made by someone else that is not true, it is not necessary to add that this declaration should damage another man, since the lie always damages someone, even if it is not a specific person, but humanity in general, when people disable the source of law and put all contracts under suspicions. The duty of being honest is a sacred commandment of reason that unconditionally commands; the lie which conversely harms the entire legal order.

For Kant, the freedom to publicly express in no way can be associated with the idea of the act without prudence to civil law to disseminate untrue information. Furthermore, as free thought it is submitted to the law that reason gives to itself and the lie is a maxim that never can be universal. Strictly about the ethical duty, the lie is a violation of duty for itself. Then, lie is a maxim that never can be universal, its use is ethically reprehensible. On the other hand, the possible damages that come from lie to members of society could become the author susceptible to legal punishment, such as the case of false testimony in a trial, a lie that leads to obstruction of justice, or the manipulation of public opinion that incites to rebellion.

The great information flow and mass media are characteristics of the current context provided by diverse technological advances and beyond doubt, the internet is the most significant of all. Through the internet, billions of people connect to a global network every day from the most different places and devices. Many people use anonymity in social networks and associate the freedom of speech with the idea

of express their right to talk about absolutely everything they want without prudence to laws, or even use public space to disseminate false information with the aim of prejudice against someone. If we analyze such practices from a Kantian point of view, it would be disallowed from a legal and an ethical perspective, since it would cause damage to civil society and humanity, in a general way. It damages the fundamental premise of publicity: the human progress toward better. Moreover, the dissemination of these lies used to formation of public opinion would be an expression of despotism which are subordinated to citizens, it is worth remembering the essay about *Enlightenment* which Kant (1991, p. 103) about the people's tutors and regarding spiritual matters, says that the fact of people shall be immature "is an absurdity which amounts to making absurdities permanent". Here is the exact expression: "the blind leading the blind".

The use of an immoral theory of prudence contributes a lot to the comprehension of this corruption. Ricardo Terra (2012, p. 132 – 133) rightly remembers that prudence is a political virtue. From the appropriate knowledge of natural mechanism without giving up of pure and fundamental right result the good politic, the good use of prudence, and the policy produced by the moral politic that aims, according to Ricardo Terra, citizens' well-being; but only see its acquisition in the addition of action that has as starting point the right. However, an immoral theory of prudence can set up, men who are imbued with this theory, according to Kant, can honor the right to themselves, but in practice, they frame apologizes to keep distance of right, they "invent hundreds of excuses and deceptions in order to avoid it in practice and to ascribe to brute force the authority of being the source and unifying bond of all right" (Kant, 2006, p. 100).

Kant denominates these men of political moralists, as they subordinate principles to their aims, and they do not measure efforts to execute their own interests. The concealment promotes a certain opacity as a supply of thought that is present in social relationships as much as in the public sphere, Kant accepts this as a characteristic for keeping a possible and civilized necessary life in society within the limits of decency, it extrapolates this function when the right is subordinate to the aims of political moralist, so it moves on to a level which the practice can be classified as dishonest. Obviously, we cannot rule out the dissemination of lies that manipulate the public opinion to the point of creating a sedition, it is among strategies adopted for the reach of hidden political purposes. It constitutes as maxims that should be kept in secret, and cannot be publicized, under penalty of attracting the opposition of everyone against itself, these maxims are arranged in the shadows where any light can be mistaken with a shiny another, but when submitted to the touch of a stone in a way of publicity, using the Kantian expression, it "is nothing but pure outward show and shimmering misery" (Kant, 2006, 12).

It is always appropriate to remind that the thought while being communicated in the public sphere shows openness to dialogue, analysis, counterargument so far from a solipsistic monologue pretentious true. When the aim is enlightenment, namely increase the autonomy of thought, we should distrust of every speech that announces itself as unquestionable truths to follow, the fetters of immaturity strengthen these truths. Evidently, the Prussian philosopher that strongly defended the public use of reason and combated the lie, also warned about its ethical and legal ravages, but he could not measure the proportion that it has taken in a marked society by technical-scientific development and how the lie threatens the politics. Hannah Arendt was a reader of Kant that lived in a time much later him, she also talked about lie in a context that gave clearly signs of its more harmful consequences.

3. The Factual Truth in Public Sphere According to Hannah Arendt

The public sphere scenario is currently seen with suspicion and such discredit for most of the citizens. It occurs especially due to the inappropriate postures adopted by politicians that, as Plato already emphasized, leads to political degeneration, when the politics is contrary to its own nature. In this regard, this degeneration configures itself when the politics is used to the realization of the rulers' selfishness, as a way to be favored of what is public and, therefore, becoming instrument of personal enrichment, taking over public funds and, when it is used to serve shadowy interests of a minority. Indeed, however this degeneration of the politics has been pointed by Plato in the ancient Greece, or in the eighteenth century by Kant, reporting the immoral use of the prudence by political moralists, subordinators of the law to their own particular interests, the degeneration also is present in the currently political context. Hannah Arendt, German Jewish philosopher, analyzes in her essay *Truth and Politics* (1967), present in the book *Between Past and Future*, several questions that alludes to the public sphere and relates to the truth, the untruth and the politics itself, highlighting that her analysis about those elements present a commonplace – the public space. The focus of the analysis of this topic revolves around the use of the untruth on the public-political sphere, from a currently phenomenon called fake news, in place of the factual truth itself that, according Arendt, is the truth that is involved by inherent facts and events to the history and the web of human relations.

It is essential highlight that, to Hannah Arendt, the morality is necessarily related to the act of think, in other words corresponds to “this silent dialogue of myself with myself” about any subject (Arendt, 2003, p.91). The thought is a moral precept of the unconditional way: to act morally precise, first, think. And this thought, that emerge of a reflection about any occurrence of life, has a character even more relevant when performed in the intimacy of the person himself.

As a result, the author still affirms that ethical exercise is related to the act of remember about the actions of the past, that help to build a referential to a point where is not allowed to the person making acts without first thinking in the consequences or commit the same mistakes. “If I refuse to remember, I am actually ready to do anything” (Arendt, 2003, p. 94). Therefore, stopping to think in what was done and what needs to be done is indispensable to a person who worries with moral and ethical values.

On the other hand, the politics in the view of Arendt, belongs to the collective thought sphere, that is, as Celso Lafer (2018, p. 130) your area of jurisdiction is not the pure thought of the dialogue between myself with myself, but rather a dialogue which I should reach in agreement. The dialogue is only possible in a public character space, where the use of the discourse and of the action reveals itself, therefore, as the political world. This public character of the politics refers to the relevance brought by the factual truth, that will support to this plural dialogue and, consequently, the risk that the untruth projects in the public life. In that sense if the politics, by definition, happens in the public space, in the space that Arendt calls of *between the man (in-between)*, then there is no doubt that the politics involves the use of language, that has almost nothing to do with conceptual definitions or with the expression of the immutable essence of things. The language in the politics is, especially, the expression of a point of view, the participation of a perspective, of an apprehension, always partial, of the world. What the discourse reports is the world “as it seems” to

someone, what Arendt means by approaching a Greek term: the *doxa*, namely, the opinion (PEREIRA, 2019. p. 11).

Thereby, for establishing the politics as relation, that is effective when men are together in a public space, sharing their speeches, their opinions and their actions, the author says that, differently of the rational truth – for not being subject to debates -, it is the opinion that is present in the political sphere, because the opinion is built from the exchange of points of view, of perceptions that make up the plurality of the public space, that is the fact that is not the Man, but the men who discourse and interact between them. That is the human condition of the political action itself.

Arendt asserts that traditionally the lie in political sphere was limited, because only a few people participated of the important decisions in the city and thus it was easier identify what was true and lies. According to Rosângela Chaves it is of extensive public knowledge that the secrets of State always existed, and, through the centuries, the diplomacy invariably appealed to all manner of ruse in the transactions between the nations. However, the organized lie, as instrument used by governments not as much to dupe the enemy, but to deceive the internal public, gained strength especially since the twentieth century, to the point where it seems naive the affirmation of Clemenceau in the first decades of the last century that it would be absurd any attempt to change the factual matter. The totalitarian experience, both in the Nazis version and in the Stalinist version, continues being the most traumatic example of the use of propaganda and ideology, allied to terror, with the aim of rewrite the History and suit the reality according with the convenience of who have the power. (Chaves, 2016, p. 69)

The totalitarian experience present what Arendt called organized lie or lie of mass, becoming one of the pillars of the totalitarian system because on the one hand, the organized lies stops the knowledge of the world and, consequently, make it impossible the constitution of the world itself and [...], on the other hand, the lie corresponds to the absence of the common world and inhibits the human capacity of act: without world and without true there is no action. (Pereira, 2019, p. 10). In that sense, Arendt already highlights how the ideology and the propaganda achieved increasingly the capacity of settle itself in the political sphere. We can observe that, in the contemporary era, the technological advance of the communications allowed a new form of mass manipulation in the political world, by the *fake news*, that make it easier the lies propagation and hinder the credibility of facts, that is, the factual truth:

It has frequently been noticed that *the surest long-term result of brainwashing is a peculiar kind of cynicism—an absolute refusal to believe in the truth of anything, no matter how well this truth may be established* [emphasis added]. In other words, the result of a consistent and total substitution of lies for factual truth is not that the lies will now be accepted as truth, and the truth be defamed as lies, but that the sense by *which we take our bearings in the real world* [emphasis added] — and the category of truth vs. falsehood is among the mental means to this end—is being destroyed. (Arendt, 2006, p.343).

Based on this, it is noticed that the exercise of thinking in the political world, most of the time, certainly does not aim to a sincere dialogue with the goal of achieving an agreement for the benefit of people, but rather aim for manipulation of them: the political power does not concern about acting in accordance with the correct; but, yes with what could be more advantageous to who exercised it. On the other hand, it is known that currently the means of communication have gained great prominence as for the

direct influence in the way of thinking and acting of the citizens, what could be well seen in several historical events, as the Nazism itself, that used the propaganda to strengthen its ideology of persecution, especially, to the Jews, and, recently, in the awareness of fraudulent news (*fake news*) published in social networks, that helped in the victory of the current President of the Republic of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro. Rosângela Chaves tells that: there is no doubt yet about the primordial role of the means of communication in the building of the public opinion (although it does not mistake with the public opinion, sometimes it falls into this temptation). Therefore, the quality of the public opinion depends on the quality of the information in which it has access through the means of communication – let us remember what said Hannah Arendt: facts are not opinions (Chaves, 2016, p. 71).

The current and stable democracies by the eyes of world, seem enter in an era which reports about events lose reference in the factual truth (Bucci, 2018, p.22). The United States of America elected Donald Trump as President through his electoral campaign that had support of *fake news* which were largely shared, while the United Kingdom used deceptive advertising about the exit from the European Union. Then, we notice that the *post-truth* era prevails today, this term corresponds to arguments which flee from the truth of facts and become replaced by appeals of emotional nature that do not have commitment with reality. Therefore, the problem of post-truth is realized in face of manipulated information that aims be favorable according to the objective that someone wants to achieve, even if it is necessary use lies and untruths, this dynamics affects precisely the factual truth. Thus, this same public opinion can be exiled to the point of does not deserve anymore this name if loses the capacity of differentiate the truth from false, it becomes something like humour subjected to variations of moment, because of manipulation of facts by mass media industry when it dares to intervene on the own factual material, erasing the line between truth and lie, between fact and opinion. This kind of attack on truth can occur in the most diverse ways: with the creation of “factoids”, events and statements without context, the approach of biased and partial about a particular issue, the editorializing of news media when opinions seem disguised as unquestionable facts, the omission of facts, the sensationalism, not open for the contradictory, etc. (Chaves, 2016, p. 71)

Arendt (2006, p. 311) emphasizes that the conflict between moral and politics is quite old, as well as the struggle for power does not destroy factual truth: “the chances of factual truth surviving the onslaught of power are very slim indeed; it is always in danger of being maneuvered out the world not only for a time but, potentially, forever” . Facts and events have their own fragility, since they occur within the constant change of public space, it is different of theories or human discoveries that come from reason, so it depends of a protection for not become swept away from time. Still in the philosopher’s point of view, it is important discuss about the existent conflict between rational truth and politics, since as Chaves (2017, p. 67) says if every pretense for absolute truth has success it undermines the public space. According to Pereira (2019, p. 11) Arendt, not rarely, reported the affinity between truth and authoritarian regime since the truth is not subject to debates. Under this point of view, the truth reveals its antipolitical nature when silence the speech: its presence dismisses and is incompatible with the exchange of ideas. Hence, a charge so serious about a classic theme of the history of philosophic thought seems to undermine any attempt to address the political action under perspective of truth.

In this regard, the truth is coercive and does not allow discussion. So, we can ask to ourselves – is the truth inefficient when we talk about politics or political public space? According to Hannah Arendt, the

rational truth is apolitical, and thus inappropriate to public political sphere. As a solution of this conflict, Arendt points out to what she called factual truth. This factual truth refers to events and conjectures that involve several people that are dependents of confirmation, and for its guarantee of existence, it must be spoken in public sphere or even in particularity. The factual truth has a political nature, such as the opinion that depends on factual truth to exist, for this reason the freedom of opinion can be considered a fraud, if it does not have a questionable nature. Fact cannot become opinion since its truth is imposing, in other words, factual truth carries with it the coercion of be what is: “all truths – not only the various kinds of rational truth but also factual truth – are opposed to opinion in their *mode of asserting validity*.” (Arendt, 2006, p. 321). Therefore, the factual truth does not depend of opinion or consent to stand up for itself, since it has imperative force and, for this reason, enters in conflict with political power: its nature is tyrannical and bothers who wants to come to power and stay there.

For bringing this perspective to the Brazilian case, between October the days 26 and 29, the organization Avaaz through IDEA Big Data realized a study which showed that 90% of president Bolsonaro’s voters consider as truth fraudulent news broadcasted by social networks as Facebook and Twitter. The Organization of American States (OAS) pointed out that the use of fraudulent news to manipulate people’s opinion in elections through private networks of communication, most probably, does not have precedents. Others research coordinated by other institution highlighted that most of the untruthful news were launched against the Worker’s Party, at that time it included the candidate of the same party, Fernando Haddad.

Likewise, in October 2019 the daily newspaper *The Guardian* released an analysis about how fraudulent news that were widespread by messaging app, WhatsApp, benefited Jair Bolsonaro’s conquest of presidency in the election of 2018. *The Guardian* had access about twelve hundreds messages which were shared during election, and it concluded that right-wing generated approximately 42% of fraudulent news against only 3% produced by left-wing. The fake news were about supposed fraud in voting machine, and attacks directed to left-wing politics and activists, most of time these attacks used homophobic, antifeminist, and libelous insults. Then, considering the far-reaching of people through social networks, there is a strong indication, if not evidence, that fraudulent news contributed significantly to Jair Bolsonaro’s victory.

For Hannah Arendt, the main opposite of factual truth is not the mistake, but rather the lie. The cases narrated previously correspond to lies that are meticulously prepared which aim influence the result of elections in favor of a certain candidate. The lie in social networks, mainly regarding politics but not only, became an extremely ethical problem, since the liar believes have found a free space to adjust his “facts” as he thinks is better for the object that he seeks, he become more reliable than who say the truth. Still in the understanding of the philosopher, the main issue is not the replacement of truth for lie, but rather the ability of lie to elaborate a process of destruction of truth which turns evident the political violent politics. “All these lies, whether their authors know it or not, harbor an element of violence; organized lying always tends to destroy whatever it has decided to negate” (Arendt, 2006, p. 337). Thus, the facts, as well as untruths, are not well protect under wings of power.

Facts assert themselves by being stubborn, and their fragility is oddly combined with great resiliency—the same irreversibility that is the hallmark of all human action. In their stubbornness,

facts are superior to power; they are less transitory than power formations, which arise when men get together for a purpose but disappear as soon as the purpose is either achieved or lost. This transitory character makes power a highly unreliable instrument for achieving permanence of any kind, and, therefore, not only truth and facts are insecure in its hands but untruth and non-facts as well. The political attitude toward facts must, indeed, tread the very narrow path between the danger of taking them as the results of some necessary development which men could not prevent and about which they can therefore do nothing and the danger of denying them, of trying to manipulate them out of the world. (Arendt, 2006, p. 346)

As Eugênio Bucci well points out the issue of social networks and internet are not in the technological advancement or the ease of communication provided for individuals, but rather in social relationship and how it impacts human life in a negative way, and consequently in public sphere. The quickness that news get to users and the profit generated by fraudulent news are the main reasons why sites as Twitter, Facebook and Google help to increase the phenomenon of post-truth. The great problem, then, surrounds in the way that the society in general use these news technologies of information, it includes those who profit and who buy information both are not worried about sources and veracities.

The news currently highlights people's entertainment that provides good or bad emotions that are in continuous disengagement with facts around and ethics. Today the factual is sensationalist, far from being understood as a truth. It seems that the big business of communication and social networks do not worry as they should for the ethical practice of these actions, as they do not worry about the antidemocratic impact of proffering invalid information and how it will have a negative impact in public space. Communication practices used on social networks that are not based on careful checking or truthfulness criteria of plurality, bury and compress islands that observe the classic protocols of press. (Bucci, 2019, p. 28)

As well said previously, Hannah Arendt defends that every way of persuasion can lead to destruction of factual truth, however they cannot replace it. That is why philosophy understands as indispensable protection of institutions such as judiciary branch and universities, since both should be necessarily autonomous and independents. According to the thinker:

Very unwelcome truths have emerged from the universities, and very unwelcome judgments have been handed down from the bench time and again; and these institutions, like other refuges of truth, have remained exposed to all the dangers arising from social and political power. Yet the chances for truth to prevail in public are, of course, greatly improved by the mere existence of such places and by the organization of independent, supposedly disinterested scholars associated with them. And it can hardly be denied that, at least in constitutionally ruled countries, the political realm has recognized, even in the event of conflict, that it has a stake in the existence of men and institutions over which it has no power. (Arendt, 2006, p. 348)

It is noteworthy yet that Arendt emphasizes the important role of press in the society. Regarding the search for factual truth, it should be, necessarily, investigated out of political sphere. The reason is we should protect the freedom to reveal factual truths as they are, even if they damage power, "for this very important political function of supplying information is exercised from outside the political realm, strictly speaking; no action and no decision are, or should be, involved" (Arendt, 2006, p. 349).

From what were presented, it can infer that in the contemporary society the use of lie become explicit and regular with its most diverse ways and manifestations. In the political sphere the lie wins a new highlight even more meaningful, since is evident that it represents a danger to the current democracies, especially the Brazilian one that never being so fragile as nowadays which its leadership of the bigger state is exercised by an individual who was elected with a significant help of fake news. Assiduous Hannah Arendt's reader, Celso Lafer (2008) highlights that the factual truth is not an opinion issue. For that reason, even the democracy, which presumes the respect for citizenship and responsibility of power requires the ruled rights for exact and honest information. The ruler's word massacres, hides, and puts into question the base of democratic public life given by the factual truth. During the variation of versions, it leads to apathy, cynicism, and indifference.

In addition, fraudulent news that create lies are not only a public danger, but also a way of make money. It happens as were expected, and for this reason, should be accepted. Thus, politics is constructed from lies that are scattered in diverse mass media in an indiscriminate and without social responsibility that, in some way, are freely broadcasted for users that cannot perceive how they are manipulated in proportions ever seen before. The global society, for example, follows being quickly devoured by this new context where the lie is profit and the truth is a historic rarity almost disappearing.

4. Conclusion

Kant and Arendt, despite the difference of moments that they wrote, and, consequently, the worries that conducted their texts, seem agree about the malefic unequivocal that lie can bring to the public space. Kant is assertive when he affirms that the public use of reason should always be free, the freedom of speech, and the freedom to become thought in public is committed to the enlightenment, in other words, to the autonomy thought, thus the impossibility of rupture with authorities is typical of immaturity, it makes men who are directed by other easy prey to power-hungry manipulators that are committed to their own interests. Nevertheless, for the author, the freedom of speech does not bring with it the idea of people freely express whatever they want, thinking for oneself does not constitute a tool for dissemination of false information, but rather to lead for public space the analysis, as an example, of civil laws, and the way that ecclesial faith adheres to statutory laws, etc. The submission of themes to the public scrutiny contributes to human progress toward better, since the exercise of thinking imposes to itself the reception of maxims, and considering that our choices should take into account the question: can the maxim become universal? It reflects the responsibility that each choice leads, once each man represents humanity.

On other hand, autonomy is also a convocation of erudite public that can influence even principles of government. In this scenery, there is a category that includes fraudulent and untruthful maxims, they are unacceptable from an ethical point of view as much as legal, since the bad use of freedom promotes the deceit and distrust which put the contracts in doubt and the human own dignity in risk.

Hannah Arendt, just as the Kantian thought, emphasizes the importance in human life of thought before action. Moreover, the philosophy defends that the factual truth in public space has a significative value regarding to collectivity, it alerts that people in power will act against facts that are unfavorable to them. Distort facts and create lies in favor of political power is an old action. This reality, nevertheless,

won serious proportions with the expansion of mass media, especially with the emerge of social networks. What happens is that fraudulent information reveals itself as a great opportunity of business, in other words, they are creators of large fortunes for who monopolize the new communicational networks, with this purpose they ignore all ethical dictates which can result in impacts to public life. Beyond doubt, it is an unprecedented phenomenon that the society must confront as soon as possible, it depends on an effective control and a new ethical paradigm.

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