Structures and Precautions of the Fundação Nacional do Índio: Analysis of National Management Reports 2008-2018

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Abstract
The present work aims to analyze aspects of FUNAI management present in its national reports in order to assess the possibilities of action and the precariousness in the state indigenist agency. Considering this objective, the procedures were documental research, for data collection, and content analysis, to understand the data collected. Five categories were highlighted from the reports: People Management, Demarcation and Inspection of Indigenous Lands and Protection of Isolated Indians, Ethnodevelopment and Territorial/Environmental Management, Budget and Execution of the Agency and Licensing and Compensation for Enterprises. Such categories allowed us to conclude that FUNAI, as an official indigenist body, is precarious in many aspects of its management, which prevents it from carrying out actions that are part of its institutional mission.

Keywords: Public Policies. indigenism. FUNAI precariousness. Rondônia.

1. Introduction
This article aims to analyze aspects of FUNAI management present in its national reports in order to assess the possibilities of action and the precariousness in the state indigenist agency. Considering this objective, it is essential to understand how the agency, responsible for coordinating and executing projects that protect and promote the rights of indigenous peoples in Brazil, develops its work groups and projects, considering the national scale of its actions and the dialogue with the local, regional and international scales. We understand that FUNAI's actions have a direct impact on local populations, even when they are carried out nationally.
The methodology used was the analysis of the content of (BARDIN, 2016) in search of data that came from "what was said for what was said", establishing analyzes between information presented directly in the text and then aiming to build scenarios about FUNAI's management processes considering external elements. Five categories of analysis were constituted, described in more detail in the methodology section and in the results and analyses.

Regarding the reports in general, we have some periods that change the aesthetics and writing of the same, while central elements such as the estimated and executed budget, the axes analyzed here (in different programs, but with the same tone). We observed during the two Lula administrations that the body presents changes and adopts the term ethnodevelopment more frequently, in the Dilma Rousseff administrations we have the reports with greater complexity of numbers (and quantitative of pages) with the largest description of the expenses, already in the two years and Through the Temer government, we have a decrease in information and resources to spend, in 2018 we were impacted by the report being made in a presentation with just over 200 slides. We point out that in the 2018 management slides, the actions of the analysis axes drawn here are not detailed and grouped, making their analysis difficult.

As a result of the discussions, we point out that there is a precariousness of budget and personnel at FUNAI that is making the actions of the indigenist agency unfeasible, considering that the social demand is increasing while the capacity for action is decreasing. In this way, the scrapping of the organ has potentiated various forms of impacts, risks and vulnerabilities for indigenous populations and official indigenist agents, among them: structural and physical violence, need for self-defense, constant territorial invasions, intensification of the illness process, less interest in the indigenist career and reduction of the staff, among others.

2. Methodology

The present research has as methodology the content analysis (BARDIN, 2016). Initially, understanding its objective, the documentary corpus was composed of the national management reports of the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI) made available on its official website. As a qualitative and descriptive research, it focused on the description of predefined categories that, in turn, guided the reading of documents and data categorization, as well as their subsequent analysis. Due to the documental category and for using open data, the research is released from processing by the Research Ethics Committee.

The analyzes were carried out based on five categories, considered as elements that are fundamental for the understanding of the actions foreseen in the reports and, consequently, created the corpus of analysis of this section, namely: (1) People management; (2) Demarcation and Inspection of indigenous lands and protection of isolated Indians; (3) Ethnodevelopment and territorial/environmental management; (4) Budget and execution of the body; (5) Undertakings Licensing and Indemnities. After defining these categories, the results and difficulties of the FUNAI programs that developed such actions were sought in the reports.

The analysis sought to interrelate the data to compose a general spectrum of the category in the analyzed years. The following information will be highlighted: the year, text highlight, the nature and forms of the impact, counting on the agent and forms, describing the risks and vulnerabilities.

It is important to emphasize that, respecting the principle of representativeness of Content Analysis
3. Results and Analysis

This section of the article will present the highlights of the application of the content analysis methodology described in the section above. Our first category is about human resources. The limitations of human resources and specialized staff were used as a crucial element for the precariousness of FUNAI's actions and projects in all the years analyzed. The question is to think about the precariousness of the indigenous body in a double section: first, a strong budgetary tie (with decreases, contingencies, late transfers) and with a decrease in the technical-bureaucratic body, thus making it impossible for effective actions by both the effective body of FUNAI, both by outsourced workers and by field actions with other bodies, such as the Federal Police. Everything gets worse when we reinforce the lack of internal knowledge management, while it is reported in most of the documents analyzed that the official indigenist agency in Brazil does not have a specialized database in which it works and also efficient talent management platforms/people.

We will mention one of FUNAI's important attributions, that of territorial protection. This element creates/extends risks and vulnerabilities of indigenous populations in the state of Rondônia and in Brazil as a whole due to the fact that external pressures - caused by various reasons, but centered on the proposal that invasions occur due to preservation in IT being superior that of non-indigenous territories (SANTOS & KOZEL, 2022) - being one of the main triggers of impacts/violence against indigenous populations. The FUNAI Territorial Protection Directorate (DPT) contained 102 civil servants in 2010, 106 in 2011, 107 in 2012, 103 in 2013, 95 in 2014 and 87 in 2015 (FUNAI, 2008-2018), a number of employees decreasing while demands only increase, if we consider the increase in population and territories: in 2010 we had 505 (12.5% of the national territory) indigenous lands and in 2015 a total of 726 (13.8% of the territory).

We emphasize that the Territorial Protection Directorate is also responsible for the demarcation of new lands (a broad process that is mixed with different spheres) and also for the protection of isolated peoples, groups in great vulnerability when we talk about processes at different scales: both in the by contact with small and large landowners as well as by the damage caused by large enterprises, such as the Machadinho HPP (Rondônia) where in their previous studies they have already demonstrated impacts in areas where isolated peoples roam. With the precariousness of human resources, the ethnoenvironmental protection fronts are also precarious, exposing isolated populations to the dangers of contact without intercultural mediations.

The 2014 Management Report (FUNAI, 2008-2018) also brings us important reflection on human resources: in addition to the low number of civil servants, the lack of regulations governing the work regime in indigenous activities in indigenous lands also impacts on FUNAI, which makes it difficult the systematic performance of the agency in the ITs, causing bad consequences for the populations. There are no benefits for the labor specificities of indigenous work, such as: additional risk, remuneration and infrastructure for permanence in the field, where it usually takes place in inhospitable regions (FUNAI, 2008-2018), difficulty for employees to remain in places where there are permanent conflicts, thus, the agency’s action is temporary where it should be permanent, we cite as consequences: “it forced Funai, in recent years, to close protection
bases in strategic regions for the protection of isolated Indians, such as in Acre (TI Isolados do Rio Envira), in Amazonas (Vale do Javari TI), Rondônia (Cautário Base – Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau TI) and in Roraima (Yanomami TI)” (FUNAI, 2008-2018).

We add this to the fact that the agency's field agents do not have police power, which makes effective punitive actions in the field (and even in the bureaucratic sphere) unfeasible and also enhances the exodus of civil servants or the staff or the Territorial Protection Directorate - even though this power is regulated in Law No. 5.371, of December 5, 1967 and its updates. It is also interesting to think in the context of the 2013 and 2014 reports that external actions of political interests unrelated to the action of FUNAI further precarious the formation of the human resources framework, not only by not hiring, but by the numerous lawsuits and by the benches against the demarcation of human resources. indigenous lands that intend to undermine such processes.

The training of servers at the headquarters and decentralized units is a way of expanding the agency's action by considering all the forces, at different scales, that act contrary to them. The 2014 report ends with a sentence - “It is noteworthy that Funai's performance was harmed in 2014 due to the loss of human resources, without replacement of staff” - which could be the synthesis of the perception of this work on the human resources issue.

In 2015, the report brings an important reflection on the issue of people management at FUNAI, in which the authorized and effective staffing is possible to verify a deficit of 3,085 servers. Law No. 11,357/2006, which created several positions for the public administration, provided 3,100 positions for the agency, of which 2,595 were not filled. In this scenario, FUNAI is faced with a dilemma: there is a need for a greater number of people to meet institutional demands, while its budget is strangled by spending on salaries and other issues of the civil servants' payroll. We add this to the increasingly small budget. In 2015, a contest was held to fill 220 deficit vacancies. The salary factor is also pointed out as a factor for the evasion of new public servants, while 67% of civil servants are over 50 years old, with FUNAI being an agency with a decreasing number of new entrants and a growing number of retirees. FUNAI's approximately 2,600 civil servants should cover the national headquarters and 38 regional units.

In 2016, we have a finding that is related to the other years analyzed: “Initially, it is highlighted that the workforce of Funai is alarmingly insufficient” (FUNAI, 2008-2018), and the document continues: “The absence of public tender throughout the nearly two decades has resulted in a weakened workforce. About 70% of effective civil servants are over 50 years old, with an average of 55% with more than 30 years of public service and almost 30% with the benefit of Permanence Allowance”, it is expected that in 2020 more than 1000 civil servants will have retired, representing almost 50% of the current number. The contest held in 2015 with the 220 vacancies with approved on the date of January 27, 2017 had not yet been called, with no scheduled date yet, 202 of the 220 approved were called until January 2018.

The General Coordination of People in 2016 reported the need to carry out a contest with 2 thousand vacancies, however it sees impossibility due to the budget being increasingly restricted. Recruitment of interns, requisition of civil servants from other bodies, carrying out an internal removal contest, suspension of removals on an ex-officio and upon request, suspension of the granting of licenses to deal with private interests and
requesting the return of transferred servants are some of the proposals. of this Coordination for the year 2017. From 2015 to 2016, we have a reduction of approximately 250 thousand to 413 thousand of resources spent on remuneration of temporary employees in the body, which dries the sheet, but at the same time makes the service scenario of the FUNAI to indigenous peoples.

In this year's report, it is pointed out – in much of the talk about people management – the need for training of servers in order to improve the action of the already small group. 113 internal training events were carried out, however external training was suspended by Ordinance 654/Pres/16 regarding the granting of benefits of this nature, a fact that, in addition to the contingency, led to the total spent on employee training to R$ 205,839.13 in the year.

The 2017 report points out issues similar to previous years. Thus, observing the methodological criteria, we will analyze some data that are differentiated or highlighted in the management analysis for the year, such as: even with 48% of the total servers, the northern region still has a deficit of human resources to execute its needs, the total deficit of civil servants (comparing the total number of authorized vacancies with those filled) is 3662 civil servants and the total of 64 newcomers to 325 graduates in the agency in 2017. Which means that the already scarce human resource pointed out in previous reports has decreased significantly considerable, making it even more difficult to carry out institutional missions.

There is a strong tendency towards an increase in the average age of FUNAI employees, which, according to Ivan Stibich (STIBICH, 2019), makes it difficult to carry out some field activities, for example, entering more distant indigenous lands. At the same time, the total number of civil servants has decreased year after year due to dismissal processes (a low financial incentive compared to the dangerousness of the field function) and retirements.

The hiring index presented in the 2017 report shows the appointments (213 in 2017 of the total of 220 approved in the contest) and the forecast of available servers in the face of the possibility of dismissals due to retirement or other reasons. It is expected that 2020 will end with a total of 1255 employees in FUNAI's staff, while since 2008 (first report analyzed here) it has already been indicated that the total number of employees is not enough to carry out the agency's missions.

We emphasize the word “collapse” used by the team that produced this report to summarize the path of the organ that may even continue to exist, but will not be able to perform its functions as official indigenism either. It is clear then that the intention is to reduce this service and focus on other institutions.

In 2016, the government invested 202.8 billion reais directly in its Agricultural Plan 2016/17, a value much higher than the almost 1.2 billion invested throughout FUNAI in the last two years. This great difference is explained by the logic of agrarian developmentalism in Latin America (STAVENHAGEN, 1985) which will invest in sectors that will generate a surplus in the trade balance, guaranteeing governability by expanding the “share” of economic elites that, at the same time, have political fronts and control over some mass media. In the 2018 report, there is no substantial information on this debate, there is information that the amount spent on personnel is responsible for a large part of the consumption of FUNAI's available budget.

Our second category will deal with the issue of Demarcation and Inspection of Indigenous Lands and Protection of Isolated People. According to the 2011 Report (FUNAI, 2008-2018). in the year “approximately
184% (one hundred and eighty-four percent) of the initially planned physical goal 13 was achieved, with the execution of 24 “Completed Regularization Stages “. This number cannot be higher, according to the document, due to the financial transfer already explained earlier in the year, below the requested and with low budget execution.

This element is reinforced in the 2014 report, where “It is noted that the amount executed by the Territorial Protection Directorate – DPT has been decreasing since 2012, in that year 18% of Funai’s total resources were committed, in 2013 it fell to 17% and in 2014 it was 15%, due to the strong contingency that occurred since 2012.” (FUNAI, 2008-2018). Following the analysis already carried out in the “Management of People and Processes” element, the Territorial Protection Directorate has suffered several attacks from the point of view of personnel and resources available to it, as well as objective 0943, which intends to fully use its lands by the indigenous populations becomes precarious, giving rise to other forms of exogenous violence against indigenous populations.

Another issue, which is part of the legal process, is that the main expense of the budgetary resources of the action of demarcation, delimitation and land regularization refers to the indemnities paid by FUNAI to individuals for improvements implemented in good faith in indigenous lands, points out the report by 2014 (FUNAI, 2008-2018). During the land tenure regularization process, as guided in the normative instruction 02 of February 03, 2012, which guides as procedures for indemnification of occupants in good faith, the inspection of occupations and improvements, evaluation, preliminary technical analysis, deliberation, appeal, judgment and finally payment, always considering the time and form of occupation.

Even in this action for compensation, the intentions to remain on the land, of not receiving the indigenist agents, the absence of documentation to start the compensation process, in addition to judicial decisions that paralyze the process of demarcation of the land, are recurrent. This context shows us that a process of removal of non-indigenous people for land demarcation requires a Herculean effort from FUNAI and its servants, while the resistance forces come from private and state agents at the local and national scales.

The issue of compensation for the demarcation of indigenous lands is pointed out again in the 2015 management report, pointing out the low staff to carry out the processes, the refusal of non-Indian occupants to allow inspections of improvements for compensation and an impeditive judicial decision as the main critical criteria of the policy.

A fundamental point, in addition to the budget, is the external action clearly pointed out by FUNAI reports from 2013 onwards. (CASTILHO, 2014) - and of state agents (CIMI, 2018) with the clear intention of harming the demarcation processes of indigenous lands. The agents involved in these forms of impacts are of different scales: political agents, federated entities, representatives of economic categories (large entrepreneurs, rural unions and ore extractors), actions that create political, legal and physical instabilities that make unfeasible the actions of the Boards responsible for the demarcation processes. In 2016 and 2017 we have the lowest budgets since 2006, with 2017 being the lowest in the previous 12 years.

What was detailed here in the years 2011 to 2013 is systematically repeated in 2014 to 2016 (FUNAI, 2008-2018). In the 2016 report we found such difficulties systematized and pointed out as recurring. The following are mentioned as repetitive elements: the lack of technicians who work in the land area and without
replacement in a public tender, the refusal of non-indigenous occupants to allow the work of the field team, little interest or refusal to receive compensation and vacate the land as soon as possible. which leads to the judicialization of the process, judicial decisions paralyzing the process of administrative demarcation of the indigenous land, budget restrictions that cause paralysis or discontinuity of projects, insufficient staff for strategic actions, external pressure on the Regional Units.

The actions that prevent the demarcation of indigenous lands permeate several scales: first, the precariousness of human resources (both technical in the field and strategic) and for the execution of projects that take place on the scale of the national organization of budgetary policies for official indigenism, on the scale national/local we have the judicialization of projects that involve local private agents and impacts the process at FUNAI (which also alleges too few personnel to meet these legal provisions).

Finally, at the local level (the territory itself) we have non-indigenous agents who refuse to receive technicians for the study and verification of improvements, they refuse to leave the IT or any form of contact. All the actions and agents involved make the demarcation action even more difficult and adding this to the political postures (debated in chapter 2 of this thesis) of the governments we have a large number of individuals with their lives put at risk - political/legal or demarcation instability increases violence and local instability.

Regarding the demarcation of indigenous lands, it should be noted that this number has been decreasing to the point where we had 0 demarcations in 2018 under the Temer government (and the promise, fulfilled so far, not to mark any land during the government by Jair Bolsonaro). Indigenous discourses revolve around the issue of land and its importance for the maintenance of the cultural and biological life of the people.

Professor Manuela Carneiro da Cunha (CUNHA, 1992) highlights that the major problem in the relationship with indigenous peoples has always been the issue of land, from João VI to Jair Bolsonaro, through all forms of governments and national and international elites. The point is that with Lula's governments (mainly the 2nd) we observed a slight shift towards more popular actions in relation to indigenous peoples, through the restructuring of FUNAI, prediction of larger scale contests, creation of participatory councils (STIBICH, 2019)) and with the Dilma and Temer governments having a shift in the government's position towards the agricultural market and the decrease in contact with indigenous populations and all this is reflected/caused by the precariousness of FUNAI in a systematic way.

Territorial management (category 3 of analysis) carried out by FUNAI is applied by the National Policy for Territorial and Environmental Management of Indigenous Lands (PNGATI). This policy was initially conceived in 2008 when indigenous populations demanded a different treatment from the State in relation to indigenous lands and their populations. The Interministerial Working Group was formed by sectors of the Ministry of the Environment, FUNAI, APIB and with partner institutions, “The Group was composed on an equal basis, with six government representatives and six indigenous representatives, endorsed by the National Commission of Indigenous Policy (CNPI).” (FUNAI, 2008-2018). PNGATI was enacted by Decree 7,747 of June 2012, almost four years after the first institutional debate. PNGATI aims to:

“The objective of guaranteeing and promoting the protection, recovery, conservation and sustainable use of
the natural resources of indigenous lands and territories, ensuring the integrity of indigenous heritage, improving the quality of life and full conditions for physical and cultural reproduction of current and future generations of indigenous peoples, respecting their sociocultural autonomy, under the terms of current legislation. (FUNAI, 2008-2018, p. 13)./

PNGATI’s main axes are the preservation of the natural resources of indigenous lands, promoting the participation of peoples, promoting the elaboration and systematization of the environmental situation of the lands, promoting sustainable and traditional use of resources, promoting ethnozoning, expanding the governance and indigenous participation in these processes and prevention, sustainable and traditional use of natural resources, recovery from environmental damage and training, training, exchange and environmental education for indigenous and non-indigenous actors. These central axes lead to several others.

We will now bring the example of the GATI Project in the Igarapé Lourdes Indigenous Land in Rondônia (FUNAI, 2008-2018). In 2013, the project began with the establishment of priorities based on consultation with the community, considering what was carried out in the Participatory Ethno Environmental Diagnosis already developed in 2012. It is noted that the new indigenous policy of the Lula-Dilma governments (STIBICH, 2019) has already applies in this project, in partnership with several institutions, FUNAI starts to organize the promotion of sustainability of communities for indigenous populations.

In the Igarapé Lourdes IT “after a systematic analysis, it was possible for the participants to measure the actions that had been carried out (18%), not carried out and started (43%), but not completed (23%) (FUNAI, 2008-2018). based on these data. It is possible to point out that there is a difficulty, caused by local issues and by FUNAI itself, in carrying out a considerable execution of these projects. The GATI Igarapé Lourdes report ends with two notes: the need to strengthen indigenous self-organization and the dangers of the actions of external agents that hinder and threaten the projects (FUNAI, 2008-2018).

Carrying out an analysis of PNGATI at the national level, now returning to the discussion of FUNAI’s annual Management Plans, we highlight some important data, their scales and impact agents: In the initial four years (2012-2015) FUNAI supported 67 Programs, surpassing the four-year goal was 51. In 2015, the agency supported 15 projects.

The first issue that we have to think about, precisely in the discussion about official indigenism and from the intention of a new perspective for it from the Lula-Dilma governments is that there is a wide need for the participation of non-indigenous agents to support these actions. from inside and outside the government, in the case of the Igarapé Lourdes TI, we highlight, among the many partnership entities, the action of Kanindé, COIAB and the Pacto das Águas, in addition to IBAMA, Military Police, Municipalities, among others, mentioned in the 2014 report (FUNAI, 2008-2018).

Another issue is that the internal agents that cause damage and, consequently, impede or hinder the execution of the project are linked to the exploitation of natural resources in a predatory way, different from the sustainable discourse/practice of PNGATI. A third possible analysis is that in 2015, for example, the agency reached 15 projects, which if we consider the total number of indigenous lands (678) in the year is a very small figure.
In 2016, we can highlight that the PNGATI had not yet been widely implemented, during the year 55 actions were implemented to integrate Indigenous Lands into the PNGATI Bioma Cerrado training plan. A further 26 plans were implemented across the country. Continuing to read the 2016 report, what can be understood is that an agency iswaning, which points to the expansion of partnerships and the reduction of already scarce resources to improve its actions and expand the inspection of indigenous lands.

With the objective of expanding from 180 to 250 indigenous lands inspected per year until 2019 (remembering that the total number of indigenous lands in 2016 was 705), the authors of the report emphasize that with the precariousness of the agency and the increase in agents of fires, invasions and other illicit actions, the picture tends to intensify: “In Indigenous Lands, it is estimated that the deforestation rate has increased, about 280% higher than the previous year, from 68 km² in 2015 to 190 km² by October 2015. 2016.” (FUNAI, 2008-2018). coming to the conclusion that with the low budget and other limitations this number will be higher every year. In 2017 we have a continuation of these results when 27 territorial management plans were implemented.

In this way, this scenario emphasizes that state indigenist practices were not developed only by the State itself, but that other local agents act directly in this implementation and that local agents are also responsible for the damage caused, there is an implicit support/violence binomial in this context. It is important to emphasize that the contingency legislation and guidelines for costs with per diems/displacements, in addition to FUNAI's meager budget, are some of the elements at the national scale that lead to the expansion of vulnerabilities of indigenous populations.

An important issue highlighted in 2016 also refers to the new indigenous policy of the Lula-Dilma governments that continued in the Temer government (STIBICH, 2019) that pointed to the regionalization of processes. Despite the good intentions, some problems have already been highlighted in this chapter, such as the difficulty of budget application and the precariousness of personnel, which now add to the pressure of local agents (indigenous or not) for the execution or not of regional projects. Regarding territorial management, the management report points to the continuity of previous processes, without showing more specific data.

Ethnodevelopment almost unanimously represents two perspectives: first, to promote subsistence activities and income promotion for indigenous populations, generally including non-indigenous productive actions such as monoculture and animal husbandry. Territorial management, which is related to the previous term, represents “they are configured as participatory processes of building community agreements in favor of sustainable management of indigenous lands” defined FUNAI in its 2013 report (FUNAI, 2008-2018).

Verdum (VERDUM, 2018) agrees with FUNAI's position when he points out that ethnodevelopment differs from what has been done (participatory indigenism) when it comes from the perspective of indigenous people and is not actions for them. While for the western perspective of development indigenous populations are obstacles and from this perspective they become ethnocidal, ethnodevelopment is an alternative to these processes (VERDUM, 2018). Since development is postulated as an inexorable evolutionary path for those peripheral countries that wish to achieve social qualities, we have easily attached to those that do not, in general, seek such a standard of living as impediments. In this context, debates about “alternative development” (STAVENHAGEN, 1985) and ethnodevelopment arise in this theoretical-practical bulge.
The central idea is that when we recognize that “underdeveloped” countries cannot reach the same standards as developed countries, alternative forms of development (ESCOBAR, 2011) began to be sought by third world countries and social movements of different types, small groups of researchers and institutions on national and international scales.

The first strategy used by alternative development is the maintenance of the basic living conditions of the population instead of the search for economic growth, then the use of internal, endogenous criteria to guide the standards and searches of that group, accepting traditions as points of departure, support and not an obstacle and, finally, it proposes to respect and not submit to the environment (STA VENHAGEN, 1985).

This alternative development is based on the use of local resources oriented towards self-sustainability at the local, national and regional scales. Stavenhagen (STA VENHAGEN, 1985), debating with Sachs, points out that this form of development does not deny international cooperation, but affirms that it must occur in terms of the third world or that people who propose other forms of development, not by imposition as he details (ESCOBAR, 2011) when composing the third world and the rules for its existence. In summary, these are the dilemmas that were thought of in overcoming the hegemonic proposals for capitalist and predatory development.

In summary, the development proposals for the “third world” (ESCOBAR, 2011) revolved around agricultural development, with the experience of industrialized countries with a temperate climate and the impositions of international organizations that ignored the existence of the peasantry and traditional populations such as the indigenous. Stavenhagen (STA VENHAGEN, 1985), discussing the disappearance of the peasantry in this context, states:

An innocent answer would say that the Third World imported the theory of development as it was formulated into the developed countries and, insofar as the peasantry in the latter had long disappeared, it should not be considered relevant to the development of the Third World either. (STA VENHAGEN, 1985, p. 12).

The author states that a similar position to the peasants is given to the ethnic question. An important issue addressed by the author is that when ethnic leaders lose spaces of power or visualize violence against populations, they usually react ethnically. Even if they are, especially in Latin America, in the position of poor peasants and colonized indigenous people, the answer tends to be organized around the ethnic question. An important example could be seen with the candidacy of indigenous leader Sônia Bone Guajajara as vice president of the ticket led by the PSOL. At the same time that it claimed class aspects, the slate's government plan had several ethnic claims, sometimes translated into non-indigenous environmental or social projects: such as sustainable development in relation to the territorial protection of the ILs.

From this line of thought, we conclude that ethnodevelopment is the search for development within this ethnic group issue. This stance is related to endogenous issues: the definition of what “well-being” or “development” is based on different cultures and, as a result, the paths that will be followed to reach such a level. Ethnodevelopment is not, in theory, that populations seek the models imposed as “Progress” by international financial organizations.
In 2015, FUNAI's budget for ethnodevelopment was around 0.281% of the agency's total budget. When considering the objective of the proposal, summarized in Goal 15 of the 2015 report “Goal: Reduction of socio-environmental illicit actions in indigenous lands, through coordinated inspection and ethnodevelopment actions” we start from a first analysis: considering the more than six hundred indigenous lands in the year, would a value of this magnitude account for the fulfillment of this objective? Here we highlight this key excerpt from the 2015 Report:

“The articulated inspection and ethnodevelopment activities carried out in 2012, in a total of 47 indigenous lands, aimed mainly at curbing illegal logging, predatory fishing and hunting, the entry of invaders, and promoting the deactivation of mining in Indigenous Lands. Of the actions listed above, 30 had the participation of public security and/or government agencies (Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources - IBAMA, Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation - ICMBio, Federal Police Department - DPF, National Force, Environmental Military Police Battalions and Brazilian Army)” (FUNAI, 2008-2018, p. 96).

In 2013 there were 118 actions in 640 indigenous lands, in 2014 112 actions in 53 ILs, in 2015, 102 actions in 73 ILs (FUNAI, 2008-2018). Even if the numbers change significantly (such as the high rate reported in 2013), two issues are presented as a pattern, first the need to curb the progress of predatory activities by external agents in every year of this quadrennium and then the participation of public agencies of security and government in these actions. Illegal logging is the main predatory phenomenon in ILs in the Amazon, because in addition to the economic exploitation of this resource, its removal opens up space for other actions – invasions, subdivisions, agriculture, livestock, mining, among others.

In 2016, in the area of Ethnodevelopment, more than 200 projects were supported in this year. Among these, 40% are related to agriculture, 14% to extractivism, 12% to livestock and the rest to various events such as training, seminars and thematic workshops, benefiting around 9,074 indigenous families. ”(FUNAI, 2008-2018). In the year, there was a 36% cut in the resources available for ethnodevelopment projects and another important factor: the database on ethnodevelopment at FUNAI was implemented in the year the report was written and it is expected that in the following years a comparative basis will be available.

In 2017, we have some issues that already demonstrate the constant decrease in ethnodevelopment projects: only 40 thousand indigenous families are predicted to be impacted by the projects, most of them already under development, 20 territorial and environmental management plans were developed and 40 were monitored, in the year, approximately 12 million in revenue were committed, which led to only 16.4 of the 40 projects being attended to, with 40% of the projects linked to agriculture, extractivism and livestock and the others in training and workshops.

Both public policies are related to the cultural and logistical processes necessary for their implementation, both in the application of projects in the sector and in the displacement itself. Having applied these concepts, it becomes necessary to reflect on the perspectives presented in the documents analyzed here.

Topic four is about budget and its execution. In 2011, it was identified that the low budget sent to
FUNAI, in addition to the difficulties of decentralization of the same, had low budget execution: “44% of the Regional Coordinations had an execution below 25%; 27% executed between 26 and 50% of the resources; 19% between 51 and 75%, and only 8% managed to execute more than 75% of the resources” defines the 2011 report (FUNAI, 2008-2018).

Regarding the ethndevelopment processes, which, in theory, would lead the indigenous populations to an autonomy in the face of economic (only symbolic-discursive) protection of the State, their execution was compromised. Due to several factors, only 38.5% of the indigenous people who would be served by the 2711 program, which deals with investment in infrastructure for domestic agricultural production, were effectively covered - we add to this the increasing invasion, precarious living conditions and reduction of the FUNAI and we have several processes of vulnerability being amplified by crises in the existence of these populations.

In 2015, FUNAI's budget was defined by the Annual Budget Law 13,115 of April 20, 2015, with an initial value of 639.3 million, of which almost 356 million were invested in staff maintenance. This year, the contingency was 22% of the total, as of publication 8,456 of May 22, 2015, this amount being 140.646 million. FUNAI's budget for 2016 was defined by the LOA at 536.1 million, even lower than that of 2015. The year's report summarizes the situation:

“Since 2013, Funai has been suffering successive cuts in its budget allocation, but the magnitude of the reduction imposed in 2016 resulted in a profound restriction of the activities necessary for the inspection, regularization and environmental management of indigenous lands, the protection of isolated indigenous peoples and recent contact, the realization of the social and citizenship rights of indigenous peoples and their cultural preservation. In addition, the budgetary allocation authorized for Funai's administrative expenses became insufficient for the payment of fixed expenses and contracts already signed.” (FUNAI, 2008-2018, p. 29).

In addition, it is worth noting that “24% of the amount of the budget limit, equivalent to R$ 29.6 million, was granted to Funai only as of November” points out funai in 2016 (FUNAI, 2008-2018). making many actions unfeasible and even the use of these resources. About discretionary expenses, which are those that allow flexibility to the public manager and effectively compete for the production of public goods and services, that is, that are not linked to fixed expenses of the agencies.

Considering the Updated Annual Budget Law, the analysis of the budgets shows that between the years 2012 and 2016, FUNAI had a nominal drop in its planned budget of approximately 28.5%. Monetarily updating the values from 2012 to 2016, it appears that, in real terms, the drop in FUNAI's budget allocation is approximately 45.8% in the period studied.

The most effective budget execution of discretionary expenditures of all years occurred in 2016, since there is an identity between the updated LOA and the total commitments in the year. This data confirms two things: first, that even with the relatively larger budget in the years before 2012 to 2015, FUNAI had a problem of technical capacity to apply the budget in discretionary expenditures, especially in the regional ones, as indicated in the 2012 and 2013 reports, as early as 2016 we have a downsizing of this value and, consequently,
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a use of it at the limit and still not meeting some issues already pointed out in the highlighted text above.

The cut in this type of budget is justified in central government actions and at the same time it is the one that directly impacts on public policies that cover indigenous populations. As already mentioned, in 2017 we have the lowest FUNAI budget, which impacted several actions analyzed here.

Our last topic, licensing and indemnification of enterprises, makes us understand that it is important to analyze this element so that we can first identify the role of FUNAI that “In the processes of environmental licensing of enterprises with potential impacts on Indigenous Lands, Funai is the intervening, taking care of the evaluation of these impacts with the licensing agencies, at federal and state level, and the entrepreneurs” (FUNAI, 2008-2018).

Then understand how these projects relate to development projects in the time frame studied here, especially by the impetus of these projects from the Growth Acceleration Program that was one of the developmental bets of the PT governments. Thus, we have the State on both fronts: both as the cause of the impact caused by the induction of works and as responsible for the prevention, mitigation and compensation of the impacts resulting from the projects.

What the reports show us, every year, is that FUNAI has spent a considerable part of its capital on monitoring projects to ensure the effective participation of indigenous populations in the processes that involve such actions, as the 2017 report “Highlights” points out. the follow-up of the processes in all their phases, from the identification of possible impacts to the implementation of mitigation and compensation measures with indigenous peoples” (FUNAI, 2008-2018).

This year, more than 100 conclusive manifestations were carried out, focusing on the analysis of small enterprises. The report also requests that maintenance and expansion of working conditions be carried out so that the goals related to licensing are completed, we believe that such maintenance and expansion can be applied to the entire body and its work fronts.

In 2018, the meager report does not fully detail the actions for indemnification of enterprises, however the opening letter of the document made by Wallace Moreira Bastos, president of FUNAI, draws our attention in one of his speeches in the 2016 report:

“Funai also played an outstanding role in the dialogue with the indigenous people, thus ensuring the progress of essential undertakings for the Brazilian State that depended on the consent of the affected peoples, such as authorization for the construction of the Manaus-Boa Vista Transmission Line, granting of the environmental license to the Bridge on Highway BR 080 and the Protective Plan for BR 158” (FUNAI, 2008-2018).

In the ten years analyzed, searching for the keywords and reading the sectors defined for the programs analyzed here, it was not found a mention of the enterprises with this clear positioning of the president or any other writer, the placement of the enterprises as essential for the Brazilian State and that depended on the consent of the affected peoples. Pointing out the dichotomy between the well-being (progress) of the State and of Brazilians and indigenous peoples (who need to give consent for such well-being to occur). In the course of the document, there is no longer any direct speech, which denies or confirms the president's speech, only
the placement of the monitoring of licensing as an action of FUNAI plus some specific cases.

Regarding compensation for occupants in good faith in indigenous lands, they are carried out based on the analysis of the verification of improvements carried out by the occupants provided they have not been occupied in bad faith (in a violent way or with prior knowledge that the territory was indigenous). This procedure in the regulatory process for indigenous lands represents a high cost for the agency, reaching 22% of the budget executed at the headquarters in 2018.

4. Conclusion

The precariousness of the national indigenist agency is systematically represented by the data analyzed above. Assirati and Guerreiro (ASSIRATI & GUERREIRO, 2011) point out that the visions of development and ideal society are anchored in socioeconomic arrangements that tend to vary according to the government's ideological position, but the State has acted in a colonial way over the indigenous “always”.

As a result, state indigenist thinking is assimilationist, tutelary and welfare, having bursts of rupture with such perspectives with intense debates pointed out by Stibich (STIBICH, 2019) and Antônio Carlos de Souza Lima (2012). In the years 2012 to 2018, the dominance of the perspective that the market use of land should be a priority, both for the realization of large enterprises, mainly in the PAC (VERDUM, 2018) and the exploitation by smaller actions of public and private agents, increases.

One of the elements of political pressure on governments is what Assirati and Guerreiro (ASSIRATI & GUERREIRO, 2011) call the institutionalization of agribusiness, which changes the scales of influence of these agents: if before the “agro” acts took place in place or even in municipal instances /from villages with the advancement of power and the expansion of this sector in the share of Brazilian GDP, organizations were formed at the national level that seek to implement their anti-indigenous actions in a systematic way.

The Anti-Indigenous Congress document (CIMI, 2018) presents the large number of proposals covered by the ruralist bench, with 164 proposals in 2008, 359 in 2013, 621 in 2015 and 848 legislative proposals in 2017 that attack indigenous rights. Brazil being one of the most unequal countries in land distribution, unadjusted taxes on rural property and 90% of the rural area produces commodities, facts that result in great pressures on indigenous populations that have different treatment with the land.

Some points show the beginning of the shift in favor of the rural front and having this sector as the engine of development: the proposal by the then Minister Gleisi Hoffmann that other public bodies be activated in the demarcation processes with great action by EMBRAPA (ASSIRATI & GUERREIRO, 2011) (STIBICH, 2019), the favorable position of the government in favor of the time frame and the suspension of all demarcations by the government, all these actions in 2013.

Between 2011 and 2014, we have the peak of infrastructural development works motivated by the second phase of the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC). All these cases demonstrate the intention of the three powers to dismantle the rights of indigenous peoples recently conquered by the Federal Constitution of 1988. Assirati and Guerreiro (ASSIRATI & GUERREIRO, 2011) emphasize that such dismantling could not occur without the accentuation of the reduction of the workforce and the decline of the budget from FUNAI.
In 2019, around 13% of the national territory is located on indigenous lands at different levels of demarcation and, on the other side, 56% of the national territory is in the possession (legal or illegal) of 1% of the population. In Mato Grosso, 83% of private lands are large estates and indigenous lands have a population density of 149 inhabitants per square kilometer, whereas outside indigenous lands, this density is 7 inhabitants.

Yet another highlight is important: the demarcation of indigenous lands expands, but does not provide permanence and total security to indigenous people. The national environmental and territorial management policy has, as already demonstrated, few resources to carry out against the intentions of invaders and other violent endogenous agents.

Analyzing the highlighted factors of the annual management reports - People management; Demarcation and Inspection of indigenous lands and protection of isolated Indians; Ethnodevelopment and territorial/environmental management; Budget and execution of the body; Licensing and Compensation for Enterprises - it is possible to perceive an incapacity of the indigenist agency - which has this function - to mediate in a broad and effective way the relationship between the State, indigenous peoples and private agents and less and less, due to the precariousness already discussed, it is close to reach your goals.

On the other hand, for the indigenous people, such processes cause impacts that come from this national scale to the regional and local scales, leading them to adopt other procedures of resistance that pervade, but are not restricted to, FUNAI, triggering private and state agents for the sum of forces.

5. References


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