CEO tenure and earning management: Empirical Study on Manufacturing Companies Listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange

KOMALA SARI SARI

doi:10.31686/ijier.vol8.iss1.2071

Authors

KOMALA SARI SARI

University of Lampung, Gedong Meneng, Bandar Lampung, Indonesia

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31686/ijier.vol8.iss1.2071

Keywords:

Accrual earnings management, real earnings management, the CEO of the early, late CEO, career concern theory

Abstract

The action raises earnings management accounting reporting scandal in the business world. Research on management of profit made by the CEO at the beginning of the year working period and at the end of his tenure is comprehensive regarding the CEO incentive to undertake earnings management. Several previous studies have focused on the accrual-based earnings management techniques. But in this study earnings management is also measured by the real earnings management to get more comprehensive results. This study predicts that the CEO in the early years of operation will increase the earnings management earnings (income-increasing) which can be explained by the theory of career concerns.

Author Biography

KOMALA SARI SARI, University of Lampung, Gedong Meneng, Bandar Lampung, Indonesia

Faculty of Economic and Business

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