Scientific Revolutions as Categorical Transformations:Rationality, Structural Invariance, and the Evolution of Knowledge

Alexander Wang

doi:10.31686/ijier.vol14.iss1.4293

Authors

Dr. Tong Wang Guangzhou Vocational College of Science and Technology Author

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31686/ijier.vol14.iss1.4293

Keywords:

scientific Revolutions, category theory, structural Invariance, evolution of knowledge

Abstract

Philosophical accounts of scientific theory change face a persistent dilemma: how can episodes of radical conceptual transformation remain rationally constrained? Kuhnian paradigms emphasize rupture but lack formal criteria for tracking structural continuity, while structural realism preserves continuity at the cost of leaving transformation itself unexplained. Existing approaches offer theories of comparison, but not theories of transformation. This paper develops a categorical reconstruction of scientific theory change that resolves this impasse. Scientific theories are modeled as structured objects and inter-theoretic transitions as morphisms governed by compositional and invariance constraints. Revolutionary change is thereby reconceived as structured reconfiguration rather than epistemic breakdown. This framework provides precise criteria for theory identity, structural continuity, and rational comparability across conceptual change. By shifting explanatory priority from semantic content to morphic structure, the categorical perspective reconceives scientific rationality as coherence under transformation. Scientific knowledge emerges not as static representation but as structured evolution governed by morphic constraints.

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